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uninhabitable for an average distance of 6 to 8 miles from the crest. This range divides all the Kachins (on the Burmah side) from all the Chinese (on the Yunnon side). Further, all the Lisu, with the exception of a few scattered hamlets, and all the Lu Tzu would be on the Chinese side. Moreover, the frontier proposed is already recognized as such by the natives all along the line, even in the case of the Pien Ma people, who, while recognizing themselves a tributary to Teng Keng, still regard the watershed as the frontier between them and China proper.
3. We find that the adoption of any other frontier would be highly detrimental to the interests of Burmah and in the long run scarcely less injurious to China. Chinese territorial claims on the N'Maikha side could not be recognized without forming an enclave where all the discontented, restless, or criminal spirits could find a safe refuge beyond the reach of the British Government. This would greatly increase the expense and difficulty of even a partial administration. Such an enclave would have to be surrounded by a line of forts, maintained at heavy cost. That the Yunnan Government will not, indeed cannot, reduce its tribes to order is not a matter of speculation, but of actual experience, witness the Blamo frontier, where considerable tracts on the China side are under no sort of control and Burmah has to maintain a military police force to an extent which, so far as the British Kachins are concerned, would be wholly unnecessary.
If Yunnau cannot control these Kachins, who are close to the main trade routes and adjacent to Tengyuch, what likelihood is there that any serious steps would be taken by the Mandarins to establish order in the distant N'Maikha basin, especially when even the pretence of a military force in West Yunnan has been abandoned ? This being the case, to recognize their claims would be to involve them in constant difficulties with regard to frontier disputes. What the Chinese really want is precisely what we ought not to concede, namely, that we should save their face by recognizing their claims and they should nevertheless not be put to any expense or trouble in order to control or to police the country claimed; in other words, that we should admit their full rights of sovereignty without expecting them to fulfil any of its duties. The Taotai assures me that the Fu Yi will guarantee the good behaviour of the tribes and that he will guarantee the good behaviour of the Fu Yi; but this does not improve matters; it is simply Bardolph going bail for Falstaff. I I should, like the tailor, want better assurance.
4. We suggest that there is now quite sufficient information to enable a frontier to be laid down at Peking or London, and therefore recommend that His Majesty's Government should not consent to dispatch any further parties for inquiry or delimitation, except possibly to lay down boundary pillars when the frontier has been accepted by China We further recommend that no further discussion with the Chinese as to what the boundary is to be should be entertained after the results of the present inquiry, with the map, have been laid before them. The negotiations, if any, should be confined to the presentation of a draft Convention in which the only matter for discussion is the amount and mode of payment of the compensation to be made by Burmah for Teng Keng's claims; or, in the alternative, if the Chinese refuse to sign such a Convention, to a declaration that the water-divide is the line which we intend to regard as the frontier in future.
5. As regards payment, we suggest that not only the revenue actually obtained by Keng Teng should be considered, but also the value to the Government of Burmah of a speedy settlement. A payment of 500 rupees per annum will, in fact, more than com- pensate for the discontinuance of present actual receipts, but it will be well worth while to pay 1,000 rupees, or even a few hundreds more, to obtain an immediate acceptance of the line proposed.
While the convenience of paying a lump sum to extinguish the claims once and for all may be admitted, it will probably on the whole be preferable to pay an annuity to the Chinese Headmen, which they would receive quamdiu se bene gesserint. If after a settlement had been reached they molested or caused disorder among the people on the N'Maikha side payment could be withheld, whereas if a lump sum had been paid we should have no further hold over them. Moreover, the Chinese are more likely to be willing to accept an annual payment than a lump sum, as the latter might be regarded as a transaction for the sale of Celestial land. The money could be paid per the Consul and the Taotai to the Chinese Headmen in such proportions as the Taotai might direct, though, as a fact, Teng Keng is the only man who has any claims to a single rupee.
6. We recommend that every effort, by simultaneous and continuous pressure both at Peking and Yunnan, should be made to induce the Chinese Government to accept the watershed frontier.
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7. If they consent to this there seem no reasons why the Government of Burmah should be in any hurry to administer the country, but it might possibly be advisable to send a small expedition to establish friendly relations with the Lashi Headmen along the Ngaw Chang, Kan Sheng, and Pien Ma Rivers, and to explain to them that henceforth they are not subject to China, and that the Chinese Headmen have no right to molest
them.
8. If the Chinese still refuse to abandon their pretensions, then it will be for the Government of Burmah to consider whether the advance of British administration, or at least of control, along the N'Maikba should not be accelerated. The only argument against this (but it is a weighty one) is the expense; on the other hand, it is clear that sooner or later this expense will have to be undertaken. The people at present seem friendly to us on the N'Maikha side, and there appears for the moment to be little danger of Chinese intrigues. It is therefore probable that the sooner the task is taken up the less expensive it will be. Further, the sooner the country comes under British control the sooner the question of the frontier will be finally settled and the danger of friction with the Chinese avoided. It may be argued and admitted that the territory in dispute is of no immediate or intrinsic value, and that there is no necessity to take immediate action, or even that graceful concessions may be made to the Chinese in respect of it; it is--
"a little patch of groand That hath in it no profit but the name. To pay
five ducats, five, I would not farm it; Nor will it yield to Norway or the Pule A ranker rate should it be sold in fee."
The reply is that, in considering a frontier, attention has to be paid to the possibilities of the distant future, and not merely to the political convenience of the moment. While the territory is intrinsically worthless, it is of much importance in Graceful concessions in relation to the future administration of a vast tract of country. matters of this kind have never helped us with the Chinese; besides, to yield on this point would be to confer on our Celestial friends a damnosa hereditas.
On the whole, we submit that no time should be lost in taking such action as will place beyond all doubt or possibility of future question the principle that the whole of the basin of the Irrawaddy up to the Salween divide is within the sphere of Indian influence. To secure this it will not be necessary to touch any of the country west of the N'Maikha, nor on the east of that river, to set up an administration so precise as that which now exists in the Kachin Hills near Bhamo. All that seems to be called for is some improvement of the principal line of communication from the Shi Ngaw River, first to the Chi Pwi, then to the line of the Kan Sheng-Ngaw Chang, and then along the Ngaw Chang, all this country being gradually brought within the sphere of the Civil Officer's tour, and special attention being paid to establishing good relations with the Hparè, Lung Pang, and Pien Ma Headmen, who are nearest to China.
If these ends could be attained without fighting, there would, perhaps, be no present necessity for establishing a military post, which could not be done without great expense, especially for rationing. The country beyond and to the north of Ngaw Chang, which is inhabited by wild Marus, is so far from any Chinese influences that its administration may probably in any case be indefinitely postponed.
It is true that past experience among other Kachins goes to show that this tract could not be brought under control without military operations. But I may observe that most of the serious collisions which have occurred in the Kachin country, such as at Sima, Sadôn, and Matang in the early '90's, or at Пparè in 1900, were the imme- diate outcome of intrigues directed from the Tengyueh yamêns by Chinese officials. Now that so responsible an official as a Taotai is at Tengyueh in charge of frontier affairs, it is less likely that we shall have to anticipate difficulties of that kind; at least the Consular officers now established in Yünnan would probably be able to detect any such conspiracy. For the present I anticipate nothing of the kind, and that is another reason why the opportunity seems favourable for an advance of British control up the N'Maikha; later on the Mandarins may begin their old tricks again, for their real character remains ever the same, Naturam expellus furcá, tumen usque recurret. Further, the Kachins now understand better what British control means, and are less likely to resent it, and less likely to listen to the Chinese.
9. If the limit of our control is pushed north, it may be advisable to remember that the upper waters of the NMaikha are auriferous, perhaps highly auriferous. Until expert opinion has been obtained on the point it would be well to abstain from granting any extensive concessions in this country.
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